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Abstract: Financial and monetary stability represent elements of maximum importance at international 
and national levels, through risks borne by neglecting this subject, both for practitioners and for 
academic environment and researchers. Lack of financial and monetary stability can lead to the 
manifestation of tensions, vulnerabilities and risks which might seriously affect the process of financial 
intermediation and even growth. The problem of tensions can be formulated by the reverse analysis of 
monetary and financial stability, covering multiple aspects of institutional nature, of payment systems, 
but also of the sphere of financial markets functioning. For this reason, an exogenous-endogenous 
analysis, allowing the identification of internal and external tensions, vulnerabilities and risks of money 
market, plays a crucial role in ensuring financial and monetary stability, monetary indicators being able 
to contain, in their developments, stabilizing or destabilizing elements for monetary and financial 
markets and for economy. Therefore, this article seeks to analyze, both temporally and in some cases 
between countries, a series of macro indicator of money market in Romania to see whether and to what 
extent they may involve tensions which might affect the country's monetary and financial stability. The 
obtained results don’t indicate important imbalances of the Romanian money market, although this 
faces a number of issues. 
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1 Introduction  
If about uncertainty, vulnerabilities and risks, in the context of the stability or 
financial instability, there are numerous studies, about tensions which might evolve 
in risks doesn’t speaks or when it does, “tensions” means rather an exogenous factor 
of economic sphere (e.g. geopolitical, social, religious, cultural tensions, etc.) or 
from outside of the territory of a country, but from in the same field (tensions that 
occurs between countries) or a vague concept. For this reason, could be considered 
extremely important an analysis of the potential tensions that manifests on 
Romania’s money market. 
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Thus, the present article1 analyzes mainly endogenous potential tensions that may 
occur in the money market in Romania, which are elements with rather a structural 
valence, with direct or indirect connection with the formation of demand and supply 
of the local currency. However, it should be noted that internal developments can 
not be removed from general international image, especially that the chosen period 
2000 - 2013 (when the 2013 data were not available, the analysis was done until 
2012) included at least three important moments generating instability: - global 
economic and financial crisis - the manifestation of the sovereign debt crisis (in 
2010-2011) and the increase of sovereign debt crisis (in 2012-2013) and - cooling of 
relations between Ukraine and Russia and political and military tensions in Ukraine. 
The strongest effects have been observed for the onset of the global financial and 
economic crisis, but also other crisis can be viewed as having a significant impact 
on the money market in Romania, albeit at a reduced scale rather regional or local. 
General context, including global or regional should not be excluded, but a close 
look at national level can facilitate the identification of the causes and the effects of 
positive or negative manifestation of certain phenomena that have shaped the current 
structure of the national economy and the money market developments in Romania 
and can help us identify possible tensions, vulnerabilities or risks that may occur on 
it. 
Thus, this article seeks to analyze a series of macroeconomic indicators that can help 
identifying potential instability generating tensions in the money market from 
Romania.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Numerous studies deal with the concepts of stability, instability, vulnerability, risk, 
fluctuation. For example, Mishkin (1999) defines financial stability in report to the 
presence or absence of pronounced episodes of stress and significant disruptions in 
the functioning of the financial system. Padoa-Schioppa (2003) notes that the 
financial stability must confer resistance of the financial system to external shocks. 
On the contrary, Schinasi (2004) believes that the financial system itself can be a 
source of shocks and confidence in financial contractual relations play an important 
role in ensuring financial efficiency, but is also an element of fragility of the system.  
But financial instability, being better observed and more concrete, can be defined 
more easily than financial stability. For example, Borio & Drehmann (2009a) define 
financial instability as a „situation in which normal-sized shocks to the financial 
system are sufficient to produce financial distress, i.e. in which the financial system 
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is “fragile”. Financial stability is then the converse of financial instability.” 
Furthermore, they found that „the performance of ex ante measures of financial 
instability is generally rather poor, although some are more useful than others. Most 
techniques provide thermometers rather than barometers of financial distress”.  
Multiple definitions of financial instability are making almost impossible a 
consensus on what should be the concrete operational manner in order to ensure 
financial stability or to diminish financial instability. 
A temporal evaluation, which takes into account the signals of monetary and 
financial markets, can allow on the one hand finding moments of instability from the 
past, and on the other hand, based on a structural fragility of the financial system, 
the extent to which instability episodes may occur now or in the future. Therefore, 
there are a number of indicators that take into account financial market signals and 
signal monetary or financial instability adversities such as: indicators that indicate 
excessively low risk premiums, credit expansion and the boom in asset prices (Borio 
& Lowe, 2002a,b). However, it should be noted that there is still no satisfactory 
models and tools for measuring financial instability, many of them being unable to 
contain and explain elements of behaviour (Upper, 2007).  
There may be periods when the fragility and instability unfold, some tensions and 
vulnerabilities might be present at that time but shocks do not occur (only after 
several years) (Borio & Drehmann (2009a). Furthermore, there may be a so-called 
“paradox of instability” in which fragility is masked and financial system seems 
strong though is not (Knight, 2007). Early identification of tensions, vulnerabilities 
and risks, taking into account certain structural weaknesses, may provide efficiency 
to the strategies and policies of financial (in) stability management. 
 
3. Problem Description and Methodology 
The article aims at achieving a practical study on the most important indicators of 
monetary market (and not only) of Romania, in order to identify tensions generating 
instability. The paper uses the database of the National Bank of Romania (NBR) and 
the World Bank and the information is analyzed during the years 2000 - 2012 or 
2013, depending on data availability. The methodology consists of using statistical 
analysis, comparative in time and space, sometimes descriptive, in order to grasp the 
most relevant developments in the indicators analyzed. Thus, the article treats: the 
evolution of the gross savings and gross capital formation as the percentage of GDP, 
the evolution of the money and quasi-money growth rate, the monetization of the 
economy (%), the financial depth (%), the coverage of monetary aggregates through 
international reserves (%), the bank capital to assets ratio (%),the bank 
nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%), the real interest rate (%), the risk 
premium on lending (%), the interest rate spread (%). 
ŒCONOMICA 
 149 
Based on the analyzed indicators can be signalled some problems, tensions and 
vulnerabilities to financial stability in Romania, at the same time being useful 
information for managers responsible for macroeconomic policies, which have 
between their responsibilities financial stability issues. 
 
4. The Analysis and Results 
Analysing the gross savings relative to the gross capital formation (as % of GDP) (or 
the investment rate) (see Figure 1), we see that although the two rates fit on the same 
trend, the internal saving do not fully supports the investment process. The aspect 
can be seen as a decoupling of financial intermediation from the domestic saving 
process, knowing that financial intermediation facilitates the transfer of capital and 
risks between creditors and debtors. Lately, there has been a considerable 
improvement in domestic savings, which allows financing the economy to a lesser 
extent through foreign liabilities. This is especially gratifying, in the context of 
evolution of foreign liabilities which suffered a strong decrease after the expiration 
of Vienna Agreement I, in the spring of 2011. The agreement stipulated that the most 
important nine banks1 with foreign capital of Romania, were obliged by the IMF, 
European Commission and the National Bank of Romania to maintain there level of 
exposure on the Romanian market at the level of March 2009 (when the agreement 
was signed) and their subsidiary solvency ratio above 10%. 
 
Figure 1 
Source: World Bank data, author’s processing 
                                                     
1 The nine banks were: Erste Bank, Societe Generale, Raiffeisen International, National Bank of Greece, 
Alpha Bank, UniCredit, Volksbank, Piraeus Bank and Eurobank EFG. 
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So if we look at the evolution of the growth rate of monetary aggregates (see Figure 
2), we can say that although until 2007 it was extremely erratic and stood at 
significant levels, during the manifestation of economic and financial crisis it has 
considerably reduced and somewhat stabilized, in 2013 being back on an upward 
trend, while the evolution of the indicator for Germany continued to have a negative 
value. 
 
Figure 2 
Source: World Bank, author’s processing, Notations: BGR - Bulgaria, CZE - Czech 
Republic, DEU – Germany, EST - Estonia, LTU - Lithuania, LVA - Latvia, POL - Poland, 
ROU - Romania; * Data in frame are for Romania, data for Germany are borderless 
As we know, the growth rate of the money should be appropriate, on the one hand, 
to the supporting real GDP growth and secondly to maintaining inflation at low 
levels. So if we look monetization of an economy (see Figure 3), we can say that a 
low level of monetization, including at the level of the monetary base which is the 
responsibility of the central bank, implies currency substitution from national 
currency to foreign currency, increasing the currency risk and producing undesirable 
phenomena such as dollarization or euroisation of the economy. The phenomenon of 
euroisation must be correlated with currency savings structure, namely at the level 
of banking system - an analysis of currency bank deposits, but also with the 
confidence of individuals and companies in the national currency and with the 
foreign currency remittances. However, it should be noted that at the time of an 
external shocks, such as the case of global financial and economic crisis, the foreign 
currency inflows can record some dramatic decreases, which can lead to a rapid 
increase in the price of foreign currency or an exchange rate increase in a unexpected, 
unpredictable and hard to be accustomed manner with the internal money and 
currency markets. 
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It should be noted that in times of instability, both the population and companies will 
focus on having assets in currencies whose rates are stable or are perceived to be 
stable over time. If the currency with maximum internal stability is the national one, 
then the deposits are formed mainly in national currency, while loans will be directed 
to the currencies with high volatility in the sense that it is predicted depreciation or 
keeping at the same level of these currencies over time. However, for high-value 
loans and/or with an extended period of repayment, the national currency can be 
attractive, but only in the case where interest rates are attractive as well. 
 
Figure 3 
Source: NBR, author’s processing 
Thus, when analyzing the situation of the financial depth in Romania (see Figure 4) 
we see that it has increased from relatively lower levels (15%) in the early 2000’s to 
over 50% in the momentum of the crisis (after the year 2009) indicating either, on 
the one hand, the accumulation of significant imbalances in the economy or, on the 
other hand, a normal process of increasing financial intermediation and the living 
standard of the population. One aspect that should be noted is the fact that before 
1989, Romania was still under the auspices of the communist regime, when there 
was not any usefulness and motivation for credit, and the goods, implicitly the 
durable goods, on the one hand, did not impose the need for change them periodically 
being built to last throughout life, on the other hand, these goods were in limited 
quantities and of similar quality and there was no option for imported goods. 
Therefore, it is to some extent understandable why gradually, and especially after 
2000, Romanians' appetite for credit increased, implicitly credit of consumption, 
being motivated also by some orientation to Western-style behaviour. However, it 
should be noted that a rapid increase and/or significant growth of domestic credit in 
GDP, even if it is a transition economy, can not be neglected as a risk indicator or at 
least an increase of the financial turmoil (Borio & Drehmann, 2009b and Drehmann 
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& Juselius, 2013); situation observed in the case of Romania, when in 2004-2007 
period the indicator increased by over 20 percentage points. 
 
Figure 4 
Source: NBR, author’s processing 
Another indicator that could signal potential tensions, vulnerabilities and risks of the 
banking system as a whole and especially liquidity problems of credit institutions is 
the share of money in international reserves. Monetary aggregates can be considered 
a set of assets with variables liquidity, being the constituent components of money 
supply, issued and managed by various banking and financial institutions, while 
international reserves (gold reserves and foreign exchange reserves) are an important 
element of international liquidity which may constitute a guarantee to cover the state 
debt, while characterizing the economy of a country in ensuring economic and 
financial credibility. If we look at the evolution of this indicator for Romania (see 
Figure 5), we find that although the coverage of monetary aggregates through 
international reserves declined between 2000 to 2013, however, are at significant 
levels which can indicate a sufficient coverage of monetary aggregates through 
international reserves. Note that the decrease of the coverage of monetary aggregates 
through international reserves may indicate a perception of foreign investors in the 
sense of a weakening of the economy and especially of the credibility of financial 
institutions. Thus, this indicator can capture to a certain extent the possible tensions, 
vulnerabilities and risks to Romania’s financial stability. 
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Figure 5 
Source: NBR, author’s processing 
However, the structure of the Romanian banking system is not so adequate, despite 
good prudentially. For example, if we follow the bank capital to assets ratio (see 
Figure 6), according to the World Bank, Romania has seen a downward trend of the 
indicator in the period 2000 to 2013, reaching 7.5%, while many other countries in 
the region have registered an upward trend with values above Romania (i.e. 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia and Poland). Although the euro area, the 
European Union and countries like Germany and Spain are still below the level of 
Romania, but above 3% required by the relevant regulations on leverage, the 
situation could worsen given that the indicator for Romania will keep the present 
trend. 
 
Figure 6 
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Source: World Bank, author’s processing, Notations: BGR - Bulgaria, CZE - Czech 
Republic, DEU – Germany, EMU – euro area, ESP – Spain, EST - Estonia, EUU -
European Union, LTU - Lithuania, LVA - Latvia, POL - Poland, ROU – Romania, SVK – 
Slovak Republic,  SVN – Slovenia; * Data in frame are for Romania, data for euro area are 
borderless 
Likewise, the existence of a significant share of borrowers with a net income below 
the national average, so with a high degree of indebtedness, may indicate the 
emergence of tensions, vulnerabilities and even significant risks to the banking 
system, contributing importantly, especially when the economic cycle is 
unfavourable, to the increase in non-performing loans (see Figure 7). 
Although it can be said that the rhythm of growth of non-performing loans slowed 
down in the last two years of analysis, and the Romanian banking system solvency 
and liquidity are beyond prudential requirements, however profitability of the 
banking system in Romania seems to describe a “boom and bust” cycle with frequent 
periods of collapse especially concerning capital efficiencies. 
 
 
Figure 7 
Source: World Bank, author’s processing, Notations: BGR - Bulgaria, CZE - Czech 
Republic, DEU – Germany, EMU – euro area, EST - Estonia, EUU -European Union, LTU 
- Lithuania, LVA - Latvia, POL - Poland, ROU – Romania; * Data in frame are for 
Romania, data for euro area are borderless 
It should be noted that an important role in determining savings or borrowing 
decision is price. In this respect, an analysis of the real interest rate on loans in some 
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economies of the Union can provide explanations for lending developments in our 
country and in regional economies. In the period 2000 - 2013, the real interest rate 
(the rate adjusted with inflation and measured by the GDP deflator) had a fluctuating 
trend for most economies analyzed, but especially for Romania. It can be found 
relatively sudden increase (in years 2002, 2004 and 2009) and rather gradual 
slowdown trend (2004-2007 and 2009-2012) (see Figure 8). The year 2007 marks a 
shift in negative territory even for real interest rates on loans in Romania, placing 
thus the nominal interest rate at a very low threshold. A threshold of nominal interest 
rates very low, zero or even in a negative territory may signal the beginning of the 
problems for the banking system. The situation is even more pronounced in the case 
of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. There are opinions that support the idea that it takes 
negative interest rates to reduce unemployment and even bubbles, or there is the idea 
that in a time of economic booms inflation should be “pushed” up and kept there, 
but these ideas can encounter conservative perceptions of central banks or the 
naturally social perception that it should be a positive rewarding on savings from 
deposits. If interest rates are approaching or entering into a negative territory for a 
long time, the economy could be pulled in the “liquidity trap” and savings would be 
a loss for the economy and not the engine or future resource for development. We 
can see what happened in the economy in the period 2007 - 2014, including at the 
global level and the effect of negative real interest rates on loans was not at all the 
solution, but itself one of the problems of this situation: strong manifestation of the 
crisis and difficult post-crisis recovery. 
 
Figure 8 
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Source: World Bank, author’s processing, Notations: BGR - Bulgaria, CZE - Czech 
Republic, EST - Estonia, LTU - Lithuania, LVA - Latvia, POL - Poland, ROU – Romania, 
SVK – Slovak Republic,  SVN – Slovenia; * Data in frame are for Romania, data for euro 
area, UE, Spain and Germany are missing  
Along with the real interest rate on loans should be analyzed also the evolution of 
risk premium on lending. This indicator reflects the difference between the lending 
interest rate and the interest rate on treasury bills, for which the reduction of this 
indicator in time represents a signal of a smooth evolution of lending, carrying less 
risk (see Figure 9). In Lithuania, in 2009, the risk premium on lending has become 
slightly negative, which indicates that the market believes that some customers in 
the sphere of non-financial corporations presents a much lower risk than the 
government, in this case treasury bills being perceived as risk-bearing. If we look at 
developments in the risk premium on lending in Romania, we can see that is well 
aligned with the indicator at regional level (in particular with that of Latvia and of 
the Czech Republic) and can be considered a sign some normality. 
 
Figure 9 
Source: World Bank, author’s processing, Notations: BGR - Bulgaria, CZE - Czech 
Republic, LTU - Lithuania, LVA - Latvia, POL - Poland, ROU – Romania, SVN – Slovenia; 
* Data in frame are for Romania, data for euro area, UE, Spain, Estonia, Slovakia and 
Germany are missing 
In addition to the indicator of real interest rate and risk premium on lending, interest 
rate spread analysis, or more precisely the difference between the interest rate on 
loans and deposits, is an important indicator for the analysis of the existence of 
tensions on money market from Romania. According to the World Bank (see Figure 
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10), it can be seen that during 2000-2012 there was a decrease in the interest rate 
differential between loans and deposits by more than 14 percentage points in the case 
of Romania. This reduction in the interest rate differential is positive signal in 
assessing the financial stability from the perspective of loans and deposits price 
developments, leaving a smaller place for the manifestation of possible tensions in 
the monetary market in Romania. 
 
 
Figure 10 
Source: World Bank, author’s processing, Notations: BGR - Bulgaria, CZE - Czech 
Republic, DEU – Germany, EMU – euro area, ESP – Spain, EST - Estonia, EUU- 
European Union, LTU - Lithuania, LVA - Latvia, POL - Poland, ROU – Romania, SVK – 
Slovakia, SVN – Slovenia; * Data in frame are for Romania, data for euro area are 
borderless 
However it is possible to improve this situation, especially because in some countries 
in the region and at the level of euro area this interest rate spread is lower than in 
Romania. Although the transmission mechanism of monetary policy signals appears 
to have improved over time (the lowering of interest rates on the interbank sector 
being transmitted satisfactorily on interest rates on new loans and new deposits and 
the differential between interest rates on new loans in lei and in currency narrowing 
in recent years), however, in Romania the average interest rate on loans continues to 
significantly exceed interbank interest rates. This comes outside partly from the 
configuration of the region, perhaps also because of the relatively high margins 
between interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations and interbank 
quotations. 
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5. Conclusions 
Although there is a decoupling of financial intermediation in the domestic saving, 
lately there has been a substantial improvement in domestic savings, which allows 
financing the economy to a lesser extent by foreign liabilities, which were narrowed 
after 2011, amid the expiration of the Vienna Agreement I. 
The growth rate of monetary aggregates was strongly fluctuating until 2007, 
mitigating in 2007-2009 period and afterwards it was swinging again, in 2013 was 
standing at 8.78%, while in the Western European countries this indicator was 
showing negative values. Monetization of the Romanian economy after 2007 shows a modest 
increase of the monetary base, reflecting an adequate behaviour of the central bank leaving to the 
banking system more liquidity but also a decrease of the share of M1 monetary aggregate in GDP. This 
phenomenon can be explained by a higher reluctance of using the national currency and its replacement 
with a stronger currency. 
In Romania, the financial depth reflects a tremendous growth in 2000-2007, 
indicating either, on the one hand, the accumulation of significant imbalances in the 
economy or, on the other hand, a normal process of increasing the financial 
intermediation and the need to obtain much higher living standards. In the period 
2007 - 2013, the indicator reflected a somewhat fluctuating trend but tempered, in 
the year 2013 financial depth hovering at around the 2008 year’s value. It should be 
noted that a rapid and/or a significant increase of domestic credit in GDP, such as in 
the period 2004-2007 for Romania, can be an indicator element of risks or at least of 
the financial and economic tensions and vulnerabilities. The contribution of 
monetary aggregates in international reserves may signal a number of potential 
tensions, vulnerabilities and risks of the banking system as a whole and especially 
liquidity problems of credit institutions. For example, although the M1 monetary 
aggregate was in 2013 at the considerably higher level than in 2000, referring to the 
M2 component, the indicator reflected a decrease of more than 14 percentage points. 
This may signal a less positive perception of foreign investors in the sense of an 
economy with a still weak credibility, especially concerning the financial 
institutions. This fact is somewhat understandable considering the secondary 
consequences of the global economic and financial crisis in Europe. 
Another possible factor that may signal tensions, vulnerabilities and risks to financial 
stability is the rate of bank capital to assets ratio. According, the World Bank, 
Romania has recorded a downward trend of the indicator in the period 2000 - 2013, 
reaching 7.5%, while many other countries in the region have registered an upward 
trend with values above Romania. Although the euro area, the European Union and 
countries like Germany and Spain are still below the level of Romania, considering 
that Romania will maintain the current trend the indicator situation could worsen. 
Another source of vulnerability and tensions for monetary and financial market in 
Romania is the evolution of the share of bank nonperforming loans to total gross 
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loans, which was increasing over 8 times in 2007-2013 period. The existence of a 
large number of borrowers with a high degree of leverage can lead to the increase of 
non-performing loans, also taking into account the adverse developments of 
exchange rates of currencies which are serving the lending process (ex. the growth 
episode of RON/CHF exchange rate from the beginning of the year 2015, which 
increased spectacularly the amounts that must be repaid by borrowers in Swiss 
francs). 
Overall, after a general analysis based on macro indicators selected, we can say that 
there are some problems that may indicate potential tensions, vulnerabilities and 
even risks on money market in Romania, but can not be classified as dramatic or 
alarming imbalances that might raise serious questions on the functioning of the 
Romanian banking system. 
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